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SUMMARIES 
It is generally accepted that Huygens based proba- 
bility on expectation. The term "expectation," however, 
stems from Van- Schooten's Latin translation of Huygens' 
treatise. A literal translation of Huygens' Dutch text 
shows more clearly what Huygens actually meant and how 
he proceeded. 
C'est un fait bien connu que Huygens fondait la 
probabilite sur l'espoir mathematique. Cependant ce 
terme ne provient pas de Huygens mais de son traduc- 
teur latin Van Schooten. Une traduction litteral du 
texte neerlandais de Huygens en anglais doit indiquer 
ce qui etait l'intention de Huygens et de quelle 
maniere il procedait. 
Bekanntlich sol1 Huygens die Wahrschein'lich- 
keitsrechnung auf den Erwartungswert gegriindet haben. 
Der Ausdruck "Erwartung" kommt aber von Huygens' 
Ebersetzer ins Lateinische Van Schooten. Eine wort- 
lithe Ebersetzung von Huygens' hollandischem Text ins 
Englische sol1 zeigen, was Huygens meinte, und wie er 
vorging. 
During his stay in Paris in 1655 Huyqens learned about Pascal's 
and Fermat's achievements in probability. Back in Holland he 
wrote a small treatise on probability--the first in history-- 
Van Rekeningh in Spelen van Geluck (Calculation in hazard games). 
He sent the treatise to Van Schooten, who was glad to incorporate 
it into a work he was just preparing to be published in Latin 
and Dutch [Schooten 1657, 16601. Van Schooten himself wrote the 
Latin version, De ratociniis in Ludo aleae, of Huygens' Dutch 
original. This Latin treatise was reprinted by James Bernoulli 
as an introduction to his posthumous Ars Conjectandi [Bernoulli 
1713, 19751. Modern versions of Huygens' treatise appeared in 
French as a part of the edition of Huyqens' Oeuvres [Huyqens 
19141 and in German in the series Ostwald's Klassiker [Bernoulli 
18991. Important quotations from the Dutch text, translated 
into German, can be found in the modern edition of James Ber- 
noulli's Ars Conjectandi [Bernoulli 19751. 
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It is a well-known and generally accepted fact that Huygens 
founded probability on expectation, but it is my feeling that 
there is no clear idea about what "expectation" meant to Huygens 
and how he proceeded in details. To the contrary, I am afraid 
that some authors who have written about this matter have not 
properly grasped its essentials. I maintain that understanding 
the original Dutch text is indispensable. Van Schooten's trans- 
lation is correct, although it is a fact that Huyqens himself 
was not satisfied with it (letter to Sluse of 27 July 1657, in 
[Huygens 1914, II, 421). The Latin equivalents which Van Schooten 
preferred when translating Huygens' terminology have been a 
source of misunderstanding and confusion ever since. Historically 
it was Van Schooten who introduced the term expectatio, though 
not in the sense of our "expectation," in probability. In order 
to make things clear from the beginning, I will anticipate one 
conclusion: in Van Schooten's version, expectatio means the pay- 
off table of a hazard game, whereas our "expectation" is covered 
by such terms as aestimandam esse (valuating) and valor expecta- 
tionis (value of expectation). In other words, expectatio means 
the cataloque of what the player may expect when playing the 
game, whereas the cash value of this expectatio corresponds to 
what nowadays is called expectation. 
Let me add a few remarks on the modern versions: the French 
translation in Huygens' Works [Huygens 19141 is excellent; the 
German translation suffers from the fact that the translator 
admittedly did not understand the Latin text (see Bernoulli [1713, 
1899, I, 1141); the German translations of a few important 
quotations and the interpretation in Bernoulli [1975] are so 
convincing that the present exposition might be considered as 
redundant provided due attention were paid to this recent version. 
However, in order to enable readers not acquainted with the 
Dutch language to judge, for themselves, I will first translate 
a relevant fragment from Huygens' textras literally as I can 
into English, and afterward add some comments in a more modern 
terminology. 
1. LITERAL TRANSLATIONS FROM HUYGENS' TEXT 
. . . I take it as a fundament . . . that in gambling 
the chance * [see Section 2.2 below] that somebody has 
toward something is worth as much as that [with] 
which, having it, he can arrive at the same chance* by 
an equitable game, that is, where no loss is offered 
to anybody. For instance: if somebody without my 
knowledge hides 3 shillings in one hand and 7 shillings 
in the other and lets me choose which of either I want 
to get, I say this is worth the same to me as if I had 
5 shillings for sure. Because, if I have 5 shillings, 
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I can again arrive at having the same chance to get 3 
or 7 shillings, and this by an equitable game; which 
will be shown afterward. 
I. PROPOSITION. If I have the same chance to get a or b it 
is worth as much to me as (a + b)/2. 
IJI order not only to prove but also to discover 
this rule, I put x for what the chance* is worth to 
me. Hence having x I must be able to arrive at the 
same chance by an equitable game. Let it be the 
game which I play against another with stake x, where 
the other is also staking x; and let it be agreed that 
the one who wins shall give a to the one who loses. 
This game is equitable, and it appears that by this I 
have an equal chance to win a, that is, even if I lose 
the game, or 2x-a if I win, because then I get the 
stakes 2x from which I must give the other a. Suppose 
that 2x-a were as much as b, then I would have the 
same chance for a and b. So I put 2x-a = b, and it 
follows that x= (a+b)/2 for the value of my chance. 
The proof of this is easy, because having (a+b)/2, 
I can venture against another who will also stake 
(a+b)/2, with the stipulation that the one who wins 
the game shall give a to the other. Therefore I will 
have an equal chance to get a, that is to say if I 
lose, or b if I win, because then I take a + b, which 
is the stake, and from this I give him a. 
In numbers: if I have the same chance to get 3 
or 7, then by this proposition my chance* is worth 5; 
and it is certain that having 5, I can arrive again 
at the same chance*. Because venturing the 5 against 
another who is staking 5 against it with the stipula- 
tion that the one who wins will give 3 to the other 
is an equitable game, and it appears that I have the 
same chance to get 3, that is, if I lose, or 7 if I 
win, because then I take 10 from which I give him 3. 
II. PROPOSITION. If I have an equal chance to get a or b 
or c, it is worth as much to me as though I had (a+b+c)/3. 
In order to discover it again, let x be put for the 
value of my chance as before. Then having x, I must be 
able to arrive at the same chance* by an equitable game. 
Let it be the game that I play against two others, while 
all three of us stake x, and let me agree with one of 
them that if he wins the game, he shall give me b, and 
that I shall give him b if I manage to win. With the 
other let me agree that if he wins the game he shall give 
me c, or I will give him c if I win it. It appears that 
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this game is equitable. And therefore I will have an 
equal chance to get b, that is, if the first wins it, or 
c if the second wins it, or 3x-b-c if I win, because 
then I take the 3x that have been staked and from this 
give b to the one and c to the other. Provided 3x-b-c 
were equal to a, I would have equal chances for a or b 
or c. So I put 3x-b-c = a and x = (a+b+c)/3 results 
for the value of my chance. In the same way it is found 
that if I have an equal chance for a or b or c or d, this 
is worth as much as (a + b+ c+ d)/4, and so on. 
III. PROPOSITION. If the number of chances I have for a is 
p, and the number of chances I have b is q, then assuming that 
every chance can happen as easily, it is worth to me as much as 
(pa + @J/p + q. 
2. COMMENTS 
2.1. In Proposition II is looks as if the same thing is 
proved twice. However, Huygens' procedure, as he explicitly 
says, is first to discover the unknown value of the chance and 
then to prove it--the same procedure followed in solving equa- 
tions: first deriving the value of the unknown by transform- 
ing the equation, and afterward verifying it. 
2.2 "Chance" in the preceding text is the translation of 
kansse at the places indicated by an asterisk, and of kans in 
the other places. In Proposition III "chances" is the trans- 
lation of kanssen, which linguistically may be the plural of 
both of them. 
2.3. "Chance" as occurring in my translation has a three- 
fold meaning: 
(a) It means the whole gambling situation, or more precisely 
the pay-off table of the game or as I put it elsewhere, the 
catalogue of what the player may expect when playing the game. 
(b) It appears in the context "equal chance"; 
(c) It appears in the context "number of chances" (see Propo- 
sition III). 
Huygens' problem is to determine the "value" of chance (a). 
Huygens seems to be inclined to use chance* in the sense of chance 
(a) and chance (without asterisk) in the sense of chance (b), 
though the use is not consequential. In no case is chance* ever 
used in the sense of chance (b). 
Van Schooten translated chance (a) at its two first occurrences 
by sors seu expectatio, at all other places by expectatio. For 
chance (b) he has various equivalents: aeque facile, pari facili- 
tate, aequa sors, similis expectatio. The number of chances (c) 
was translated by numerus casuum or by the number followed by 
expectationes. 
2.4 Far fom begging the question or being tautological, or 
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circular, or otherwise surreptitious, Huygens' reasoning is 
quite sophisticated. In modern language Huygens' definition may 
read as follows: 
I take it as an axiom that in games of chance-- 
actually of a special kind-- the expectation of a pay- 
off table is the money I need to propose a game with 
the given pay-off table as a fair one. 
This definition is used to calculate the expectation of the 
pay-off table of a and b with equal chances as follows: 
Staking (a.+b)/2 while playing with another person, I can 
reconstruct the given pay-off table by making the (fair) stipula- 
tion that the winner pays the amount a to the loser. 
This is not a trivial transformation. The original situa- 
tion for which the expectation has to be calculated is that of 
an individual in a gamelike situation, yet with no adversary 
identified (say a lottery). It is reconstructed as an n persons' 
game (if n is the number of chances proposed) with equal stakes 
and the appropriate stipulations, which by virtue of their mu- 
tuality are fair. The value of the stakes under consideration 
is just the expectation. 
2.5. "Equal chance," as used by Huygens, does not beg the 
question either. In Huygens' model, where the player is given 
the free choice to take one hand or the other, or, more generally, 
to decide himself which one of a number of possibilities he 
chooses, equal chance is validly defined by the complete ignorance 
and the free will of the player. 
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